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Nearly six decades have passed since the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East handed down its judgment, in which all the defendants 
were found guilty of one or more of the charges. Six out of the eleven 
judges submitted separate opinions, among which was the Indian justice 
Radhabinod Pal’s totally dissentient one. Pal did not in the least affirm all 
of Japan’s past actions; he simply held that the defendants’ actions were 
not illegal in an indictable sense. And yet, inasmuch as the prewar and 
wartime picture of Japan painted by the official verdict came as a shock to 
the Japanese in the wake of World War Two, Pal’s opinion was interpreted 
as another “judgment” delivered by an Asian judge and functioned as an 
alternative or a strong antidote for the view of the history generated by 
the tribunal. That is, whether approving of or refuting his opinion, one 
has referred to Pal’s view as none other than “the argument for Japan’s 
innocence.” This essay will attempt to dissect how the post-war Japan has 
responded to Pal’s opinion and discuss the significance of the opinion in 
the context of Japanese intellectual history.
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Introduction: How to Approach the Tokyo War Crimes Trial
The year 2006 witnessed the sixtieth anniversary of the opening of the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial, officially known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Some 
international symposiums on this unprecedented trial are being planned to be held in 2008, 
the sixtieth anniversary of the rendering of its verdict. In April 1946, the trial convicted 
twenty-eight former national leaders of Japan, political or military, and more than two and a 
half years later, in November 1948, sentenced seven to death, sixteen to life imprisonment, 
and two to shorter prison terms. During the trial, two died and one was excluded due to 
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mental disorder. 
Based on Article Ten of Potsdam Declaration—“We do not intend that the Japanese 
shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all 
war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners”1—the tribunal 
was conducted as a major component of the Allied powers’ occupation policies in Japan. In 
other words, the trial itself was constructed as a purely political and diplomatic event. How-
ever, the intellectual influence the trial exercised on the defeated nation of Japan cannot be 
overlooked. Functioning as one of the few sources of information for the Japanese, most of 
whom knew almost nothing about what had happened in the wartime period, the trial carried 
out the task of interpreting and providing an overview of the period. Thus, it presented the 
Japanese a framework for reconstructing an identity after the war. In a broad sense, the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial can be regarded as an exercise in Orientalism, in Edward Said’s usage of that 
word.2 It enacted “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over” 
Japan—and many people accepted its version of events and attributions of responsibility.
Like its Nuremberg counterpart, the Tokyo military tribunal has often been talked and 
written about. Until now, two main approaches have been taken, one from the viewpoint of 
international law, the other from modern history. These approaches are understandable and 
have generated such scholarly contributions as Richard Minear’s pioneer work Victors’ Justice 
(1971), which argued that the trial involved flagrant abuses of law and legal procedure and a 
highly questionable reading of Japanese history. On the other hand, it is regrettable that tri-
bunal discussions have often been based largely on ideologies and sterile emotionalism. When 
an international symposium on the trial was held in Tokyo in 1983, the official pamphlet 
distributed succinctly sums up this deplorable situation:
One stance stands on the side of the prosecution and the majority opinion judge-
ment, accepting the conclusions of the tribunal without question. The other one, 
represented by the argument that the tribunal was victor’s justice, stands on the side 
of the defense and totally rejects the tribunal. . . . The confrontation between these 
two positions is barren and unproductive.3
Every panelist at this symposium except the one from the Soviet Union conceded that the 
Tokyo trial was one-sided and flawed. No representatives from neutral countries were on the 
bench, let alone Japanese judges. The indictment contained charges based on “ex post facto 
law,” such as “crime against peace” or “crime against humanity,” together with “conventional 
war crimes.” Also, “emphasis was placed on the hasty trial and punishment of the atrocities 
that had been committed by a defeated Japan.”4 As one historian observes, “consciously or 
unconsciously, we are all bound by this view [only Japan committed war crimes] and have 
not escaped its influence.”5 Some even contend that this interpretation of history leads to the 
“tendency to treat Japan as an ‘ex-con.’”6 
The positive side of the tribunal, however, should not be ignored. Some scholars of 
international law have attempted to locate its significance in the subsequent development 
of international law, contending, for instance, that the trial paved the way for establishing 
“a duty to disobey illegal orders from one’s superiors.” Even though one does not find the 
argument satisfactory, it could be said, “If there had not been a trial, there would have been 
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more people put to death. If there had not been a trial, there would not have been minority 
opinions.” The best-known of those minority views is the one submitted by the Indian judge, 
Radhabinod Pal. This essay will discuss the significance of Pal’s opinion in the context of the 
post-war Japanese intellectual history.
An Emergence of a Totally Dissentient Opinion
At Nuremberg, four nations—the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union—handed down judgments on German defendants, whereas in Japan seven other 
countries—Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, the Republic of China, the 
Philippines, and India—joined the “Nuremberg four.” The biggest difference between the 
two international tribunals, perhaps, was the fact that unlike in Germany, no fewer than five 
separate opinions were submitted at Tokyo. The Australian judge, president of the tribunal, 
contended that in sentencing the defendants, the tribunal should have considered the fact 
that the Emperor had not been indicted. The French judge complained of procedural short-
comings. The judge of the Netherlands argued that no conspiracy existed and that five of the 
defendants were innocent. The judge representing the Philippines argued that several of the 
sentences were too lenient, not exemplary and deterrent. The other separate opinion, submit-
ted by the Indian justice Pal, was not only voluminous—approximately 250,000 words and 
longer than the official judgment itself—but totally dissenting as well. 
Based on his extensive knowledge of world history and international law, Pal inter-
preted Japan’s actions in a completely different light from that of the official judgment. The 
essential points were that Japan fought wars to liberate Asia from Western colonialism and 
that all warring parties committed conventional war crimes, not only the defeated countries. 
In other words, Pal emphasized the necessity of considering the past actions of the Western 
powers prior to passing judgment on Japan. It was an interpretation unmistakably from the 
standpoint of a non-Westerner. 
Pal’s dissenting opinion consists of seven chapters: “Preliminary Question of Law,” 
“What is ‘Aggressive War’,” “Rules of Evidence and Procedure,” “Over-all Conspiracy,” 
“Scope of Tribunal’s Jurisdiction,” “War Crimes stricto sensu,” and “Recommendation.” The 
judge began his opinion as follows: 
I sincerely regret my inability to concur in the judgment and decision of my learned 
brothers. Having regard to the gravity of the case and of the questions of law and of 
fact involved in it, I feel it my duty to indicate my view of the questions that arise 
for the decision of this Tribunal.7 
Seeing that the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established to try 
each of the twenty-odd Japanese leaders and that the tribunal found all the accused guilty, the 
phrase “my inability to concur in the judgment and decision of my learned brothers” might 
lead one to suspect that Pal found the defendants not guilty. 
The Argument for Japan’s Innocence 
In fact Pal did argue that all defendants were innocent of all charges. He expressed his 
view in concrete words in the final chapter “Recommendation”:
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For the reasons given in the foregoing pages, I would hold that each and everyone 
of the accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the 
indictment and should be acquitted of all those charges.8
He thus insisted that “everyone of the accused” be found “not guilty,” yet it should also be 
remembered that he was far from affirming wholesale all of Japan’s past action. Pal only held 
that the defendants’ actions were not illegal in an indictable sense. He simply regarded the 
Japanese defendants lined up in the courtroom at Ichigaya in Tokyo to be blameless for the 
war crimes that the Japanese military had allegedly committed at the front. Indeed, as to the 
war crimes committed in the Philippines, for instance, he expressly stated: 
I need not give in detail the incidents taking place since November 1944. We are 
given several incidents taking place during this period and certainly these were atro-
cious misdeeds. These are the instances of atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese 
Army against the civilians at different theatres during the entire period of the war. 
The devilish and fiendish character of the alleged atrocities cannot be denied.9
When the verdict was announced, very few people were able to become familiar with 
Justice Pal’s judgment, for dissenting opinions were not allowed to be read in court or to be 
put into print then. During the Occupation period, the lengthy opinion was not translated 
into Japanese, probably because no Japanese publisher dared to negotiate with the GHQ on 
this matter. Consequently, the Japanese under the Occupation were provided with a very 
limited amount of information of the opinion. By some, Pal’s dissentient view was not only 
received with enthusiasm, but was even interpreted as another “judgment” delivered by the 
Indian judge that Japan was by no means guilty. The view was thus received and approved of 
“selectively.” Inasmuch as the prewar and wartime picture of Japan painted by the court came 
as a shock to the Japanese, though, such responses by Japan in the wake of the tribunal were, 
to some extent, natural and understandable. In other words, Pal’s opinion functioned as an 
alternative or even as a strong antidote for the view of history presented by the tribunal. 
Immediately after the Occupation ended in 1952, two condensed versions of the dis-
sentient judgment were presented in translation in Tanaka Masaaki’s 田中正明 Nihon muzai 
ron: Shinri no sabaki 日本無罪論：真理の裁き [The Argument for Japan’s Innocence:     
Judging the Truth] (Taiheiyō Shuppansha, 1952) and Yoshimatsu Masakatsu’s 吉松正勝 
Senshi o yaburu: Nihon wa muzai nari 戦史を破る：日本は無罪なり [Refuting the His-
tory of the War: Japan was Innocent] (Nihon Shoseki, 1952), both of which sold exceedingly 
well. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that the original opinion by Pal did not 
contain the word “innocence” in its title, with only “Judgment” on the first page, each of the 
two compilers and translators employed the word “innocence” to try to attract the attention 
of potential readers.
Pal’s opinion was thereby first introduced on a nation-wide scale as “The Argument for 
Japan’s Innocence,” the title seeming to imply that Pal affirmed all of Japan’s past actions. As 
mentioned above, however, this was far from Pal’s true intention. Since then the possibility 
that his opinion would serve as a wholesale indulgence to Japan’s actions during the war has 
been realized in part. This trend has continued even into the present century—regrettably, 
in the view of this writer. In the late 1980s, for instance, Arnold Blackman wrote: “In recent 
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years, with the revival in Japan of nationalist sentiments, Pal has become a hero of sorts 
among the neo-ultras.”10 
In Pursuit of Absolute Truth
Indeed, Radhabinod Pal attempted to judge Japan independently of the one-sided 
view of history shared by most of the victorious nations. Still, as his condemnation of Japa-
nese war crimes unmistakably suggested, he was far from pro-Japanese. He decided to em-
body his view because of his love of absolute truth, not because he was favorable to Japan. 
One could detect not a few examples of his brave words throughout the opinion. 
As early as in the first chapter “Preliminary Question of Law,” for instance, Pal criti-
cized with bitterness the judicial basis of the tribunal: 
The so-called trial held according to the definition of crime now given by the victors 
obliterates the centuries of civilization which stretch between us and the summary 
slaying of the defeated in a war. A trial with law thus prescribed will only be a sham 
employment of legal process for the satisfaction of a thirst for revenge. . . . Formal-
ized vengeance can bring only an ephemeral satisfaction, with every probability of 
ultimate regret.11
As a member of the British Commonwealth, India was on the prosecution side. It 
stood, that is, among the victors as the tribunal was created. This judicial setting notwith-
standing, the sentences of Pal’s that I have just quoted lead one to ask if he was in reality a 
judge representing a neutral nation. “Formalized vengeance” must have been the very first 
criticism of the tribunal to appear in print. In another chapter, Pal did not hesitate to criticize 
sharply one major country of the Allied powers:
It would be sufficient for my present purpose to say that if any indiscriminate de-
struction of civilian life and property is still illegitimate in warfare, then, in the 
Pacific war, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only near approach to the 
directives of the German Emperor during the first world war and of the Nazi leaders 
during the second world war.12
Although he did not explicitly name the country, with these words Pal explicitly cen-
sored the United States. It was a courageous accusation most typically expressing his conten-
tion that this tribunal was nothing but a case of unilateral “formalized vengeance,” with Japan 
alone being subject to prosecution.
We should be wary of jumping to the conclusion that the opinion represented the 
collective will of his country, although he participated in the trial as a judge representing 
India. It is instructive to observe that the separate opinion of the Dutch judge, Bernard V. 
Röling, was a private production, and he fended off pressure from his home government not 
to release it. By no means could it be called the opinion of the Dutch government. Likewise, 
Pal’s opinion cannot be referred to as the general view of his native country, but was truly his 
personal opinion.
Also, Pal rendered the verdict of innocence for all the defendants, to be sure, but 
should one regard the view as proof that Asia did not recognize the Tokyo tribunal or that 
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Asia approved of Japan’s military operations against Southeast Asia as liberating colonies from 
the West, it would lead only to an overly simplistic conclusion. In short, one should be careful 
to read and treat his judgment not as the position of India or Asia but as the view of one Asian 
intellectual. Given this background, one can appreciate Pal’s bravery all the more. 
“A Courageous Shout of the Colored Races”
In the chapter entitled “What is ‘Aggressive War’,” Pal put forth his argument that the 
past actions of the Western powers should be considered before passing judgment on Japan’s 
acts: 
I would only like to observe once again that the so-called Western interests in the 
Eastern Hemisphere were mostly founded on the past success of these western peo-
ple in transmuting military violence into commercial profit.13 
One could say that Pal incisively pointed out the essence of the history of the colonial 
domination by the Western powers. Lieutenant Commander Fuji Nobuo 冨士信夫, who 
attended most of the Tokyo trial as court clerk of the former Navy Ministry, was one of the 
fortunate few able to peruse Pal’s judgment right after the pronouncement of the verdict. 
He said he borrowed a Japanese version from a counsel for one of the defendants and read it 
twice. He recalled he had got the impression, when he had read as far as the section “What 
Is ‘Aggressive War’,” that “[t]his is a courageous shout of the colored races against the white 
race!”14 Fuji did not specify which part of the opinion had impressed him, but one could say 
that the above-mentioned citation is a case in point.
At the Tokyo trial, the racial prejudice of the Japanese was condemned by the pros-
ecution. After quoting the gist of the prosecution’s assertion, Pal presented his own view as 
follows: 
Much was sought to be made of what was characterized as A CHANGE IN THE 
JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL POLICY whereby it was designed to create in every 
youthful mind a feeling of RACIAL SUPERIORITY. 
I believe this is a failing common to all nations. Every nation is under a delusion that 
its race is superior to all others, and so long as racial difference will be maintained 
in international life, this delusion is indeed a defensive weapon. The leaders of any 
particular nation may bona fide believe that . . . the western racial behaviour neces-
sitates this feeling as a measure of self-protection. . . . The ideal of asceticism and 
self-repression has not yet been adopted by any of the modern civilized nations.15 
This observation by Pal calls to mind the following passage from Edward W. Said’s Oriental-
ism: 
It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, 
was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric . . . hu-
man societies, at least the most advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual 
anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with ‘other’ cul-
tures.16 
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Said maintains that all people in “the more advanced countries,” not just Europeans, 
have been deeply involved in racism. Likewise, the Indian judge demonstrated that Japan was 
not the only modern civilized nation under the sway of ethnocentrism. Here, one can see an 
unmistakable coincidence between Pal and Said—between Pal’s dissenting opinion, which 
totally disavowed the judgment of a tribunal that proved to be “a Western style for dominat-
ing, restructuring, and having authority over” Japan, and the Saidian concept of Orientalism, 
which criticizes the modality of non-Western domination by the West. Being an Asian, Pal 
thus presented a critique of Orientalism as applied to Japan. 
Pal rendered the verdict of innocence for all the defendants, to be sure, but should one 
regard the view as proof that Asia did not recognize the Tokyo tribunal or that Asia approved 
of Japan’s military operations against Southeast Asia as liberating colonies from the West, it 
would lead only to an overly simplistic conclusion.
Some Concluding Remarks
Before concluding this essay, I want to invite readers to ponder again the Japanese 
responses to Pal’s dissentient judgment, in particular in the broader context of how Japan 
has accepted views of foreigners on Japan. Foreigners’ interpretations of Japan sound fresh 
and instructive precisely because they present articulated observations and analyses of things 
that are taken for granted—and that thus escape detection—by the Japanese themselves. In 
appreciating these views, however, one need not put too much value on the background of 
foreign authors. 
When introducing Pal’s dissentient opinion, for instance, most people tend to point to 
his academic background, saying that Pal was the only judge in the Tokyo tribunal who spe-
cialized in international law. Not only a specialist, some go on to say, but an authority on the 
field as well. The truth is, however, Pal obtained his Ph.D. degree not in international law but 
in the philosophy of law in the Vedic age, that is, the ancient period of India. He did indeed 
publish a book entitled Crimes in International Relations (University of Calcutta, 1955), but 
that came out long after the closing of the Tokyo trial. In other words, in a strict sense, Pal was 
not a specialist in international law at the time of the trial. The significance of Pal’s dissentient 
opinion lies not so much in his academic career but in his insightful analysis of international 
law and of Japan’s past action in comparison to the rest of the world.
Despite the danger that Pal’s opinion will always be abused by paying no heed to 
his real intention, the significance of the opinion in Japanese intellectual history cannot be 
overemphasized. It has given and will continue to give clues to ponder on the interpretations 
of Westerners on Japan. Radhabinod Pal should be remembered forever as one of the few 
pioneers who, with truly brave words, condemned not only the shortcomings of the interna-
tional trial but the Orientalism toward Japan among Western countries as well. 
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要旨
「パル判決」再考：戦後日本の受容の系譜を顧みる
牛村圭
東京裁判（極東国際軍事裁判）が判決を下してから間もなく６
０年を閲す。日本人被告全員が有罪を宣告されたその法廷で
は、１１名の判事中６名が個別意見書を提出した。その中に被
告全員の無罪を主張したインド代表判事ラダノビッド・パルの
全面的反対意見書があった。パルは戦前戦中の日本の行為を全
て是認したのではなく、起訴状の意味において被告は無罪であ
ると断じたに過ぎなかった。しかしながら、東京法廷が描き上
げた戦前戦中の日本像が敗戦直後の日本人にとり衝撃的であっ
たため、パル意見書はアジア人判事が下したもう一つの判決と
解され、法廷が提示した歴史観への強力な解毒剤として機能す
るにいたった。すなわち、パル意見書を肯定する側も否定する
側も、パル意見書をほかならぬ「日本無罪論」と呼んできたの
である。本論考は、戦後日本の思想史上でのパル意見書の意義
を論じることを目指す。

